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Abstract
In this paper I analyse a labour market where the wage is endoge-
nously determined according to an Efficient Bargaining process be-
tween a firm and a labour union whose members are partitioned into
two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit the
Single-Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density
function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate that,
when preferences of one group for leisure are higher than those of the
other group the latter suffers from higher tax rates and with lower level
of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the former is
more single-minded, it may exploit its greater political power in order
to get a positive intergenerational transfer. Empirical evidence from
the WERS 2004 survey confirms main results of the model.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the interest of economists about trade unions behavior models
has been gradually increasing. The earliest studies were principally oriented
to the macroeconomic perspective and intended to explain the relationship
between higher wages generated by the presence of labour unions and un-
employment levels. From this point of view three models have been com-
petitors in the attempt to explain this linkage: the Monopoly Union model,
the Right-to-Manage (RTM) model and the Efficient Bargaining model.
The oldest Monopoly Union model was developed by Dunlop (1944) [14];
there, the union was seen as a monopolistic seller of labour which maximized
its utility function by choosing the optimal level of wage, given the firm’s
demand for labour. As a result, this model entailed more unemployment
than it would be the case under perfect labour markets and a higher level
of wage rates with respect to the competitive wage. Nowadays this model
is gradually being abandoned, due to the distance between its hypothesis
and what it is observed in reality (it never happens that employers leave the
power to decide wage to labour unions).
The RTM model was originally proposed by Leontief (1946) [31] but it
was only in the early 1980s with the British school (see Nickell and Andrews
[42] or Manning [33] amongst the others) that it acquired its popularity. The
model assumes that there exists a bargaining between a firm and a union over
the real wage, subject to the labour demand unilaterally chosen by the firm.
The wage derived by the bargaining process is lower and the employment
level is higher than that generated by the monopoly union model and the
RTM solution lies on the labour demand curve. The main achievement of
the RTM model is that the equilibrium wage and the level of employment
depend upon the bargaining power of the involved bargainers.
Finally, in the Efficient Bargaining model developed by McDonald and
Solow (1981) [41] the union and the firm negotiate both upon the wage rate
and the level of employment. The quite surprising result of this model is
that the efficient solution lies not on the labour demand curve but on the
Contract Curve, which in presence of risk-averse workers is positively sloped
and stands at the right hand side of the labour demand curve. As a result
both the level of employment and the wage rate are higher than the com-
petitive solution.
Nevertheless, these three macroeconomic models do not take some rele-
vant factors into account. First of all, they do not consider the distinction
between “insiders ”, whose preferences count and “outsiders ”, whose pref-
erences do not. Due to this distinction, the union indifference curves end
up to be kinked at the point where the level of employment is equal to the
membership (for a review of the insider-outsider models see Lindbeck and
Snower [32]).
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Secondly, the classical macroeconomic literature took the union size as
exogenously given, whilst authors as Grossman [21] started to investigate
this issue, considering the role of the seniority within the union and the vot-
ing mechanism which maximises the expected utility of the median worker.
From the early 1990s many economists such as Nickell & Wadhwani
(1990) and McDonald & Suen (1992) started to analyse, from a microeco-
nomic perspective, the role and the determination of trade union power.
This concept of trade unions, according to McDonald and Suen [41] is “the
ability of the trade union to divide up to its advantage the rents arising from
the production process given other parameters, in particular the elasticity
of revenue with respect to employment ”.
In the last decade researchers have been moving toward new fields of
research, most of them referring to the political economy area. One fertile
field is represented by the study of how workers organize in social groups
and the role of political insider mechanism; according to this literature (see
Gilles Saint-Paul [20] “workers may be unable to coordinate in order to form
a labour union, but by voting in favor of an institution that raises they are
able to collectively achieve a higher wage level exactly as if they were orga-
nized in a union. Labour market rigidities allow insiders to monopolize the
market at the economy wide level even though their bargaining power may
be quite reduced at a firm level ”. Secondly, also the impact of unions on
the voting behaviour of their members represent an interesting field which
may provide interesting results in the future.
In this paper, I analyse the role of labour unions from a microeconomic
perspective, exploiting the Single-Mindedness Theory. Wages are endoge-
nously determined between a firm and a labour union, according to a typical
Efficient Bargaining model; the labour union will be seen as a social insti-
tution of workers partitioned into two social groups (Young and Old). A
peculiarity of the model is that the firm and the labour union negotiate also
on the level of hours worked (instead of the employment as in the tradi-
tional McDonald and Solow model). This choice variable is very suitable
for an Efficient Bargaining model, since the hours worked can be signed in
a contract, representing that “manning agreement ”required by McDonald
& Solow in their paper, in order to increase employment beyond the labour
demand scheduling. Notice that the use of hours of work as a choice vari-
able in bargaining literature is not frequent at all. In the paper I will briefly
review the literature on this issue and I will conclude saying that too often
studies have been using variable choices, such as the level of employment,
which hardly are chosen in reality, instead of using hours of work which, as
I will demonstrate in the empirical section of the paper, is the issue that
toghter with the wage rate is bargained by labour unions with firms in the
real world.
An important assumption I will state in the model is that preferences of
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the old for leisure are different from preferences of the young. Under this
condition, I will demonstrate that the equilibrium wage rate and the level of
leisure of that group which has higher preferences for leisure and wage are
higher than those of the other group. Since the single-mindedness of a group,
which represents a proxy for the political power of that group, is captured
by the density function, which is a monotonically increasing function of
leisure [6], I conclude that there must exists one group who is more able
to influence politicians and that this acquired power of influence enables
it to get positive transfers. Since the Government must clear the budget,
the burden of transfers is entirely carried by the other (less single-minded)
group. Thus, with respect to previous work of mine, this study considers
the mechanisms of labour unions, seen as an institution which represents
the interests of different social groups and like every other institution take
decisions. Again, in accordance with the SMT, the greater the ability of
a single group to be focused on the minimum number of issues, the higher
the probability that this group achieves its goals. The paper is organized
as follows: section one introduces, section two makes a brief reiview of the
literature about the bargaining over hours of work, section three explains
the model, section four provides a possible extension, section five brings
interesting empirical evidence about how bargaining takes place in U.K.’s
workplaces, and section six concludes.
2 Bargaining over hours of work
At least until the 1990s the literature on unionism was principally concerned
with the bargaining outcomes between unions and firms. The models which
was developed on labour unions tried to find an answer to two questions: 1)
does the bargaining take place exclusively on wage or it also involve the level
of employment?; 2) what does the bargain power depend on? Nevertheless,
at the beginning of the 1990s the research on unionism started to involve the
problem of hours of work in the analysis (see Earle & Pencavel [15]). Indeed,
it seemed clear that McDonald & Solow’s idea to left the bargaining take
place over the employment was unealistic. At the same time, evidence on
U.S. labour union history made clear that the reduction of hours of work was
one of the main labour unions’ concern. The struggle for the reduction of
working hours is narrated in depth by Hunnicut [25] There, many historical
facts referring to the importance the labour unions attribute to working
hours are reported. Two sentences above the others: 1) “Some of the most
dramatic and significant events in the history of labor (...) and some of
the most notable achievements (such as the ten hours per day and the eight
hour day) were parts of labor’s century struggle for shorter hours”, and 2) “A
large numbers of influential writers and social critics welcomed and promoted
shorter hours, believing it was as natural and as good a result of technological
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advances as higher wages”. And even though after the Second World War
the interest for leisure in the U.S. has seemed to fade under the modern
liberal theories which taught the best way to achieve the full employment,
in Europe the struggle for the reduction of working hours is still one of the
principal goals of workers. It became obvious then, to consider the hours
of work into the labour union’s utility function. Earle & Pencavel studied
some union - management bargaining models with an utility function which
includes earnings, hours of work and the level of employment. Unfortunately
this model seems to suffer from a mis-specification problem, since hours
of work and the employment level are neither separable nor independent.
Nevertheless, this paper had the merit to brought a comprehensive and
systematic study over the negotiation about the hours of work which, as I
demonstrate later on in the paper, are a typical choice variable in the real
world.
3 The model
I consider an OLG model, where each generation lives only for two periods,
the youth and old age. At any period of time, the generation of youths
coexists with the generation of the elderly. At the beginning of the next
period, the elderly die, the youths become elderly and a new generation of
youths is born. As a consequence, there are two overlapping generations of
people living at any one time. Generations are unlinked, meaning that there
is no possibility to leave any bequest. Individuals consume all the available
income earned at a given period of time; thus, it is not possible neither to
save nor to borrow money.
Then, let a population of size equal to one be partitioned into two groups
of workers, the young and the old, each of them endowed with a given amount
of time (measured in hours). Thus, the space of groups is G = {T − 1, T},
where T denotes the group of young workers and T − 1 the group of old
workers. I will use index I to denote a social group, capital letters to indicate
the group and small letters to indicate single individuals belonging to the
I-th group. The size of a group does not change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his total number of hours H
between work (hw) and leisure (hl). I assume also that leisure can be em-
ployed to attend several activities, such as relaxing, taking care of family,
participating in political activities and many others. Thus, leisure can be
seen as a vector of N activities hl = hl(hl1, ..., hlN ), where hln ≥ 0.
Labour market is imperfect and this imperfection is due to the presence
of a labour union which bargains the wage rate with the firm, according to
a typical Efficient Bargaining model (Mc Donald & Solow, 1981). I assume
that there exists only one union and that all the workers (old and young)
are members of this union whose aim is to maximize its members’ both the
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net-of-tax income and the level of employment. A classical achievement in
the economic theory states that the presence of this market imperfection
generates unemployment in equilibrium (for an introductory analysis on the
effects of trade unions on the labour markets, see Oswald [44]).
I introduce one of the core assumptions of the model. I assume that the
old and the young are identical in every respect except one: the intrinsic
preference for leisure of a group is assumed to be greater than the preference
for leisure of the other. I will not specify which group has the higher level
of preferences for leisure, even though the empirical evidence seems to show
that the old prefer leisure more than the young 2. Finally, Old workers’
preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility function3. A repre-
sentative old worker at time t has the following lifetime utility function:
U τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log hτ−1lt (1)
∀ τ − 1 ∈ T − 1
where cτ−1t is the consumption at time t, h
τ−1
lt is the amount of hours of
leisure at time t, and ψτ−1 is a parameter representing the intrinsic prefer-
ence of the old for leisure (ψτ−1 ∈ [0, 1]). The old worker consumes all his
income:
cτ−1t = w
τ−1
t (1− τ τ−1Lt )(H − hτ−1lt ) + bτ−1t + r(Sτ−1t ) (2)
where wτ−1 is the unitary wage per hour worked, τ τ−1Lt is the tax rate on
labour income, H is the total amount of hours, bτ−1t is an intergenerational
(lump-sum) transfer and r(Sτ−1t ) represents the return which the old worker
gains at the end of time t over an amount of money he accumulated. I as-
sume that r(Sτ−1t ) represents mandatory savings. The last day of work, old
workers withdraw the amount of money invested. Without loss of generality,
I assume that the same day, they consume all their amount of money and
die.
Similarly, the preferences of a representative young worker y are given
by the following lifetime utility function:
U τ = cτt + ψ
τ log hτlt + β
τ (cτt+1 + ψ
y log hτlt+1) (3)
∀τ ∈ T
where cτt and c
τ
t+1 represent the consumption at time t and t+1, h
τ
lt and
hτlt+1 leisure at time t and t+1, β
τ is the time preference discount factor, and
ψτ is the intrinsic preference of the young worker for leisure (ψτ ∈ [0, 1]).
Finally, the parameter indicating the preferences for leisure of one group
is assumed to be higher than the same parameter for the other group: ψI >>
2for a survey on the factors which explain the difference in preferences for leisure among
social groups, see Canegrati [6]
3A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income effect
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ψ−I . Since the young know that at time t + 1 will be old, their utility
function includes the leisure of the next period, weighted by a discount
factor βy ∈ [0, 1].
The young worker’s inter temporal budget constraint is given by:
cτt + β
τcτt+1 = w
τ
t (1− τ τLt)(H − hτlt) + bτt
+r(Sτt ) + β
τ (wτt+1(H − hτlt+1)(1− τ τLt+1) + bτt+1 + r(Sτt+1)) (4)
Furthermore, I introduce the following budget constraints:
r(Sτ−1t ) = T
τ−1
t (5)
r(Sτt ) = T
τ
t (6)
nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0 (7)
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour supplied, the
taxation entails inefficiencies, since it distorts workers’ decisions on the
amount of labour supplied and determines the mandatory savings. Fur-
thermore, I assume that the wage rate does not change over time so that:
wτt = w
τ
t+1 and so I will drop the time index from the wage rates. T
τ−1
t rep-
resents total revenues generated by the taxation of the old at time t and it is
equal to nτ−1τ τ−1Lt w
τ−1(H−hτ−1lt ) while T τt the total revenues generated by
the taxation of the young at time t and it is equal to nττ τLtw
τ (H−hτlt). The
condition nτ−1bτ−1t + nτ bτt + α
∣∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0 assures that an inter-
generational transfer exists and that if one group is better off in the transfer
process, the other one must be worse off. The term α
∣∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣∣ |nτ bτt | repre-
sents the efficiency loss which takes place via the redistribution process and
can be measured by the amount of resources wasted during this process. For
instance, one may think that this loss is due to the existence of bureaucracy
costs or to rents grabbed by politicians. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents
the measure of the loss which is quadratic in the transfers.
3.1 The Government
The literature has used different formulation for the Government’s objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal
tax rate on labour, subject to a budget constraint where tax revenues are
equal to public good expenditures. Otherwise, some authors such as Ed-
wards and Keen considers a Leviathan model where, referring to the famous
milestone paper by Brennan and Buchanan [4], they examine a Government
which is concerned in part with maximizing the size of the public sector.
Furthermore, the Edwards and Keen model assumes that the Government
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retains some degree of benevolence, perhaps because it has re-election con-
cerns. Nevertheless, this concerns were not formally modeled.
In this paper, I provide a possible explanation to this issue, introducing
a political economy model where politicians act in order to maximize the
probability of being re-elected.
A public policy vector is given by:
~q = (τ τ−1Lt , τ
τ
Lt, b
τ−1
t , b
τ
t )
composed of two tax rates and two intergenerational transfers.
Finally, the Government is committed to clear the budget constraint;
this means that it cannot transfer more resources than those collected by
taxing individuals at every period of time. Thus, I assume that the Budget
Surplus (Deficit) must be equal to zero. Since the Government cannot issue
bonds to collect more financial resources and can only rely on taxation, the
increase in a social group’s welfare entails the decrease in the welfare of the
other social group, since the latter has to pay for the transfer to the former.
3.1.1 The labour union
Since the 1980s many labour economists have been trying to find a correct
specification for the labour union utility function but still there is not an
unambiguous consensus over it. Nevertheless, the idea that unions have
indifference curves defined over wages and level of employment seems to be
generally accepted nowadays. Oswald proposed an utilitarian union utility
function, where the union utility is simply the sum of the utility of single
groups. Thus, the utility function is a weighted average of they utility
derived from the groups.
Denoting by n the total members of the union which coincide with the
population (in the sense that I assume that every citizen belongs to the
union, and denoting by nτ−1 the number of old workers, by nτ the number
of young workers, by ˜wτ−1 = wτ−1(1 − τ τ−1Lt ) the net-of-tax wage rate of
the old, and by w˜τ = wτ (1− τ τLt) the net-of-tax wage rate of the young, the
objective function of the union can be written as follows:
U( ˜wτ−1, w˜τ ,Hτ−1wt ,H
τ
wt) = H
τ−1
wt
˜wτ−1 +Hτwtw˜τ (8)
where Hτ−1wt is the total amount of hours worked by the group of the
old workers and Hτwt is the total amount of hours worked by the group of
young workers. An important assumption here is that in the last two stage
of the game, the labour union, in order to bargain over the wage, acts with
an univoque position when it has to face the firm, bargaining only one level
of wage given only one level of employment. That is (8) becomes:
U(w,Hwt) = Hwtw(2− τ τ−1Lt − τ τLt) (9)
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Nevertheless, even though the general aim of the labour union is maxi-
mizing the welfare of its workers in terms of wage and employment, we must
consider that members are not all alike. A simply way to deal with this ar-
gument is dividing the workers in two groups: again, the old and the young.
In particular, I assume that the group of the old has a relative preference
for leisure and the group of the young has a relative preference for wage.
If we denote with χτ−1 the parameter which synthesizes the preferences for
the employment of the old (i.e. the average of the preferences of single old
workers) and with χτ the same parameter for the young, we may write the
(Stoney-Gear) utility functions of the two group as follows:
Ugτ−1t = χ
τ−1 logHτ−1wt + (1− χτ−1) log ˜wτ−1 (10)
Ugτt = χ
τ logHτwt + (1− χτ ) log w˜τ (11)
with χτ > χτ−1 where ˜wτ−1(w˜τ ) the wage rate of the old (young). Fur-
thermore, I introduce two constraints:
Hτ−1wt +H
τ
wt = Hwt (12)
nτ−1
n
˜wτ−1 +
nτ
n
w˜τ = w (13)
The first constraint simply assures the the sum of the employment of the
two group is equal to the number of hours bargained by the firm and the
labour union; in other words, the labour union has to decide how to divide
the total hours of work amongst its members. The second constraint says
that the average wage must be equal to the official bargained wage. This is
important, since I assume that when, in the bargaining activity, the labour
union acts as an unitary institution which represents all its members’ needs.
The bargaining outcome is represented by only one wage rate (which I will
call the official wage rate) and a total amount of hours worked. I assume also
that the firm is only interested in the global level of employment and wage
which maximize profits. Furthermore, the labour union takes its decision in a
democratic way, according to a voting process which takes place between two
candidates, which propose a policy to all the members and then workers vote
for the proposal which maximizes their utility, according to a majoritarian
principle. For instance, the two candidates may be seen as two streams of
the labour union which support the young and old needs. Thus, the two
candidates commit to a policy vector ~p = (Hτ−1wt ,Hτwt, ˜wτ−1, w˜τ ) and then
elections take place.
3.1.2 The firm
I assume that a monopolistic firm produces only one good, with a production
function which only uses labour as input, and that it maximizes profits:
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Π = Π(w,Hwt, τ τ−1Lt , τ
τ
Lt) (14)
Furthermore, I assume that the firm sells the good at a price p, nor-
malized to unity. The production function Y = F (Hwt) is represented by
a twice differentiable, concave function, and I assume that y(0) = 0, that
∂y
∂Hwt
> 0, and that ∂
2y
∂2Hwt
< 0. I assume also that the young and the old
are equally productive and thus the firm demands an amount of hours Hwt.
3.1.3 A five-stage game
I consider a non cooperative five-stage game among two political candidates,
a trade union representing the two social groups and a firm. In the first
stage the two political candidates announce their fiscal policy vector, by
choosing the optimal level of labour tax rate τLt and the optimal transfers
bt. In the second, elections take place. In the third stage labour union’s
candidates choose their optimal policy vector by deciding how to split the
total amount of hours worked and how to differentiate wages amongst the
two groups. In the fourth stage elections within the labour union take place.
In the last stage, the labour union and the firm bargain over wage and hours
worked, according to a typical Efficient Bargaining model. The maximand
is a weighted function Ω of the firm and union objective functions:
Ωt = λ log
[
U(w,Hwt)− x
]
+ (1− λ) log
[
Π(w,Hwt)− ı¯
]
(15)
where the parameter λ denotes the relative bargaining power of the trade
union (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), x the fall-back position of the labour union and ı¯ the fall
back position of the firm which without loss of generality is normalized to
zero. To solve the model I use the backward induction. I start to solve the
model from the fifth stage where the firm and the union bargain over the
wage rate, and the optimal value is determined by the maximization of the
geometrically weighted average of the gains to the two parties. Differentiat-
ing (15) with respect to w and Hwt, I obtain the First Order Condition of
the problem:
∂Ωt
∂w
= λ
∂U(w,Hwt)
∂w
U(w,Hwt)− x
+ (1− λ)
∂Π(w,Hwt)
∂w
Π(w,Hwt)− ı¯
= 0
∂Ωt
∂Hwt
= λ
∂U(w,Hwt)
∂Hwt
U(w,Hwt)− x
+ (1− λ)
∂Π(w,Hwt)
∂Hwt
Π(w,Hwt)− ı¯
= 0
The resolution of the problem gives the optimal hours worked and the
optimal wage:
H∗wt = Hwt(τ
τ−1
Lt , τ
τ
Lt, x, λ) (16)
w∗ = w(τ τ−1Lt , τ
τ
Lt, x, λ) (17)
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Comparative statics shows that w∗x < 0, w∗λ > 0, w
∗
ττ−1Lt
< 0 and w∗ττLt < 0.
That is the optimal wage tends to increase the higher the bargaining power
of the labour union and tend to decrease the higher is the fall-back position
of the union and the higher the tax rates.
If the bargain is (Pareto) efficient the optimal solution (w∗,H∗wt) must
stands over the so called contract curve (CC), which represents the locus of
tangency points between a union’s indifference curve and a firm’s isoprofit
curve defined by the following condition: (V (w)− u¯)/V ′(w) = w (1 + τLt)−
R′(Hwt) (see equation 3 in MacDonald & Solow, 1981).
In the forth stage they have to decide how to divide the optimal number
of hours worked chosen by the firm between the old and the young and how
to differentiate the wages amongst the two cohorts. I suppose that every
worker has an idiosyncratic preference toward one of the two candidate which
is not observable (σi,I,u, where superscript u stands for union) and that this
random variable is normally distributed in a closed interval
[
− 1
2suI
, 1
2suI
]
and an initial reputation advantage for one of the two candidate (δu) which
again is a variable distributed in a closed interval
[
− 12du , 12du
]
. I will not into
details about what it determines the idiosyncratic and candidate advantage
parameters and I will take them as exogenously given. Nevertheless, one may
imagine that the reputation is due to the mediatic exposure a candidate have
or by the effort put in place by some active supporters. A worker i in group
I votes for candidate R if
V I(pR) > V I(pL) + σi,I,u + δu
Furthermore, I assume that the two candidates are rent-seekers, and only
aim to maximize the probability of winning (equivalently the share of votes)
in order to win the elections. The probability of winning for candidate R
may be written as:
piR =
1
2
+
du
su
∑
I=T−1,T
nIsI,u(Ugi( ~pR)− Ugi( ~pD))
where the utility function are represented by (10) and (11). Thus, the
maximization problem for the labour union is:
max
1
2
+
du
su
∑
I=T−1,T
nIsI,u(Ugi( ~pR)− Ugi( ~pD))
where s ≡∑I nIsI,u.
s.t.Hτ−1wt +H
τ
wt = H∗wt
nτ−1wτ−1 + nτwτ = nw∗
Proposition 1 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~pR = ~pD = ~p∗
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Proof : ~p∗ represents the policy which captures the highest number of
swing voters. Suppose instead there exists other two policies ~p′ and ~p′′; in
moving from ~p∗ to ~q′ (or ~p′′) a candidate loses more swing voters than those
it is able to gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate R chooses
~p′ and candidate D chooses ~p′′ such that by choosing ~p′ and ~p′′ the elections
outcome is a tie. If one candidate moved toward ~p∗, it would be able to gain
more swing voters than those it loses and thus, it would win the elections.
So, choosing any policy but ~p∗ cannot be an optimal answer. The only one
policy which represents a Nash Equilibrium is ~p∗ since it is the intersection
between the optimal answers of the two candidates and no one candidate
has an incentive to deviate. Since each candidate maximizes its share of
votes, in equilibrium the two candidates receive both one half of votes; if
one candidate should receive less than one half of votes it would always have
the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by the other candidate and get
the same number of votes.
Corollary 1 The utility gained by the workers under the policy chosen by R
is equal to the utility gained under the policy chosen by D; that is: V i( ~pR) =
V i( ~pD).
Proposition 2 In a PVM where social groups have to split a given amount
of hours of work (or more in general a given amount of resources), the
optimal quota of resources that any social group obtains is represented by a
weighted average which is a function of the Numerosity, Density and Prefer-
ences of the group (which I will call as NDP−WAH). A suitable expression
for an NDP −WAH is represented by NDP −WAH = f
I(nIsIχI)∑
I
fI(nIsIχI)
.
Proof : The initial amount of resources that the young and the old have to
split is represented by the total amount of hours chosen by the firm at stage
six, H∗wt. Solving the PVM we obtain the two expressions which represent
the optimal quota of hours for the two groups:
Hτ−1∗wt =
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1 + sτ,unτχτ
H∗wt (18)
Hτ∗wt =
sτ,unτχτ
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1 + sτ,unτχτ
H∗wt (19)
which (is easy to see) are an NDP −WA = fI(nIsIχI)∑
I
fI(nIsIχI)
.
Corollary 2 The optimal quota of resources that any social group obtains
is an increasing function of the Numerosity, Density and Preferences of the
group and a decreasing function of the Numerosity, Density and Preferences
of the other group.
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Proof : Deriving the NDP −WAH of the group I we obtain:
∂NDP−WA
∂nI
=
(
sτ−1,uψτ−1
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ − s
2τ−1,unτ−1χ2τ−1
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt > 0;
∂NDP−WA
∂I,u
=
(
χτ−1nτ−1
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ − s
τ−1,un2τ−1χ2τ−1
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt > 0;
∂NDP−WA
∂χI
=
(
sτ−1,unτ−1
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ − s
τ−1,un2τ−1χτ−1
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt > 0;
∂NDP−WA
∂n−I =
(
− sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1sτ,uχτ
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt < 0;
∂NDP−WA
∂s−I,u =
(
− sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1nτχτ
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt < 0;
∂NDP−WA
∂χ−I =
(
− sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1sτ,unτ
(sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1+sτ,unτχτ )2
)
H∗wt < 0.
Proposition 3 In a PVM where social groups have to decide an optimal
wage with an average wage equal to the population average wage, the op-
timal wage that any social group obtains is represented by a weighted av-
erage which is a function of the Numerosity, Density and Preferences of
the group (which I will call as NDP − WAw). A suitable expression for
the NDP −WAw is represented by NDP −WAw = f
I(nIsIχI)∑
I
gI(nIsIχI)
, where
gI(nIsIχI) = gI(n2IsIχI).
Proof : the average wage is represented by w∗. Solving the PVM we ob-
tain the two expressions which represent the optimal wage rate for the two
groups:
wτ−1∗ =
sτ−1,unnτ−1w∗(χτ−1 − 1)
sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1 − 1) + sτ,un2τ (χτ − 1) (20)
wτ∗ =
sτ−1,unnτw∗(χτ − 1)
sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1 − 1) + su,τn2τ (χτ − 1) (21)
which are an NDP −WAw = f
I(nIsIχI)∑
I
gI(nIsIχI)
.
Corollary 3 The optimal wage that any social group obtains is an increas-
ing function of the Numerosity and Density of the group and Preferences of
the other group, and a decreasing function of the Numerosity, Density of the
other group, and and Preferences of the group.
Proof : Deriving the NDP −WAw of the group I we obtain:
∂NDP−WA
∂nI
=
(
sτ−1,u(χτ−1−1)
sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1) −
2s2τ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)2
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ >
0
∂NDP−WA
∂sI,u
=
(
nτ−1(χτ−1−1)
sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1) −
sτ−1,un3τ−1(χτ−1−1)2
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ >
0
∂NDP−WA
∂χI
=
(
sτ−1,unτ−1
sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1) −
s2τ−1,un3τ−1(χτ−1−1)
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ <
0
∂NDP−WA
∂n−I =
(
− sτ−1,unτ−1n2τ (χτ−1−1)(χτ−1)
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ < 0
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∂NDP−WA
∂s−I,u =
(
− 2sτ−1,usτ,unτ−1nτ (χτ−1−1)(χτ−1)
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ < 0
∂NDP−WA
∂χ−I =
(
− sτ−1,usτ,unτ−1n2τ (χτ−1−1)
(sτ−1,un2τ−1(χτ−1−1)+sτ,un2τ (χτ−1))2
)
nw∗ > 0
Figure 3 depicts the optimal policy vector in the labour union PVM.
On the horizontal axis is located the total amount of hours H∗wt and the
amount of hours in equilibrium for the two groups I and -I. On the vertical
axis there is the wage rate. The intersection between the two axis gives
the average wage rate for the equilibrium hours of work. The dashed line
indicates the situation where the total amount of hours are equally divided
amongst the two groups, H
∗
wt
2 . H
eq
wt indicates the division of hours we have
in equilibrium. The black point (E) indicates the situation where the two
groups are identical as for numerosity, density and preferences. As a conse-
quence, the amount of hours are equally splitted and the wage rate is the
average population rate for both the groups. Otherwise, the blue point indi-
cate the optimal policy for group I, whilst the red point the optimal policy
for group −I. It can be seen that the blue point is located south-eastwards
with respect to E, indicating the group I gets a level of hours greater than
H∗wt
2 and a wage rate lower than the average wage rate. Otherwise the red
point is located north-eastwards with respect to E, indicating that the group
−I gets a level of hours lower than H∗wt2 and a wage rate higher than the
average wage rate. Note the important role played by the two weighted
average means (NDP −WAH and NDP −WAH): the distance of a the
optimal policy point (i.e. the red point) from E is exactly equal to the
scalar sum of vector v1 = H
eq
wt− H
∗
wt
2 = H
∗
wtNDP −AMHI − H
∗
wt
2 and vector
v2 = NDP −AMHIw∗.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Effects on Welfare
an interesting problem which arises once we have solved the problem of the
labour union is to evaluate the effects of the optimal policy on the welfare
of the two groups. These are depicted in Figure 4.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
From a geometrical point of view a policy which neither penalize nor ad-
vantage a group is one such that the the triangle which is formed by the
two vectors representing the gain (loss) in hours worked and the gain (loss)
in wage rate is an isosceles one. In Figure 4 the two isosceles triangles for
the two groups are the white ones. Otherwise, if the triangle is not isosce-
les, it means that one dimension of the policy is out weighting the other
dimension meaning that one group is better (worse) off. In the example
the group −I is the better off group, since the gain it derives from a higher
wage with respect to the average population wage out weights the loss in
the level of employment. Otherwise, the group I is the worse off group
since the gain it derives from an increase of employment is out weighted by
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a strong reduction in the level of wage rate. Two more considerations are
useful. First of all, being this a conflict game, if one group is better off the
other one must be necessarily worse off; that is, a Pareto improvement is
not achievable. Secondly, it is easy to see that it is possible to reach an
equilibrium were both of group neither gain nor loss, but this only if and
only if the following conditions hold: NDP −WAIH = −NDP −WA−IH ;
NDP −WAIw = −NDP −WA−Iw .
Calculating the average number of hours per worker for the two groups, we
obtain:
hτ−1∗wt =
sτ−1,uχτ−1
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1 + sτ,unτχτ
H∗wt (22)
hτ∗wt =
sτ,uχτ
sτ−1,unτ−1χτ−1 + sτ,unτχτ,u
H∗wt (23)
Thus, I will suppose that workers do not chose the hours of leisure but
simply work the average amount of hours worked calculated in (22) and
(23). I substitute the two optimal expressions into the utility function of
the workers and I write the Indirect Utility Function for the two groups:
V τ−1 = wτ−1∗(1−τ τ−1Lt )(hτ−1∗wt )+bτ−1t +r(Sτ−1t )+ψτ−1 log(H−hτ−1∗wt ) (24)
V τ = wτ∗(1− τ τLt)(hτ∗wt) + bτt + r(Sτt ) + ψτ log(H − hτ∗wt)
+βτ (wτ∗t+1(h
τ∗
wt+1)(1− τ τLt+1) + bτt+1 + r(Sτt+1) + ψτ log(H − hτ∗wt+1) (25)
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify
that the elections’ outcome is a tie. The proof arises from the resolution
of the first stage, where it will be demonstrated that in equilibrium, both
parties choose an identical policy vector.
In the first stage, the two candidates, simultaneously and independently,
announce a policy vector, ~qA and ~qB. Every voter’s welfare depends on
fiscal policies chosen by candidates which affect his consumption and which
is known by both parties, and from another component, which derives from
personal attributes of the candidates and which is only imperfectly observed
by the parties. In other words, we are assuming that consumers’ preferences
for consumption are perfectly visible, whilst other political aspects such as
ideology are not. The two candidates face exactly the same optimization
problem and maximize their share of votes or, equivalently, the probability
of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but it also holds for
candidate B4.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
4for a complete derivation of the probability of winning in a Probabilistic Voting Model
see Persson and Tabellini (2000)
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s.t. T1 ≡ r(Sτ−1t ) = T τ−1t
T2 ≡ r(Sτt ) = T τt
T3 ≡ nτ−1bτ−1t + nτ bτt + α
∣∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0
In the Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the problem.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q∗
Proof : same as Proposition 2.
Corollary 4 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is:
V I(qA) = V I(qB)
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the optimal tax rates for the groups are a
function of the numerosity of groups, preferences of groups, preference of
individuals, density of group, total amount of hours, bargaining power of the
labour union and fall-back position of the labour union. That is: τ τ−1∗Lt =
τ τ−1Lt (n
τ−1, nτ , χτ−1, χτ , ψτ−1, sτ−1,u, sτ,u,H, x, λ) and
τ τ∗Lt = τ
τ
Lt(n
τ−1, nτ , χτ−1, χτ , ψτ−1, sτ−1,u, sτ,u,H, x, λ). The sign of the first
derivatives depend on the parameter of the model.
Proposition 6 Ceteris paribus, the group with lower preference for work
obtains a higher number of leisure hours than the other group.
Proof : It derives by the analysis of (22) and (23), where it is easy to see
that if the difference of numerosity and density are the same the group with
the lower χ obtains a greater number of leisure hours.
Corollary 5 The group with the lower χ is the more single-minded group.
Proof : by the definition of the SMT we know that a group is more
single-minded than another group if sI = s(hIlt) > s
−I = s(h−Ilt ) since we
have assumed that the density is a monotonically increasing utility function
in leisure. Since from the previous Proposition we know that the group
with the lower χ is the group which obtains the higher number of leisure
hours, we have that that group has also a higher density. That is, it is more
single-minded. For a sake of exposition, we assume from now on that the
more-single minded group is that of the old.
Thus, the equilibrium levels of the transfers between the young and the
old are the following:
bτt =
1−
√
sτ−1
sτ
αnτ
(26)
bτ−1t =
1−
√
sτ
sτ−1
αnτ−1
(27)
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Proposition 7 There exists a social security transfer from the less single-
minded group to the more single-minded group.
Proof : From the first order conditions with respect to bτ−1t and bτt , it is:
sτ−1
sτ =
1−αnτ bτt
1−αnτ−1bτ−1t
. From Corollary 2, sτ−1 = s(hτ−1lt ) > s
lτ = s(hτlt) it
must be 1 − αnτ bτt > 1 − αnτ−1bτ−1t for the workers. Since αnτ−1bτ−1t >
αnτ bτt , it can be seen the the group with the higher level of density obtains
the higher transfers. Given the budget constraint: nτ−1bτ−1t =
−nτ bτt
1−αnτ bτt
taking into account the equilibrium conditions s
τ−1
sτ =
1−αnτ bτt
1−αnτ−1bτ−1t
, it is
sτ−1
sτ =
1−αnτ bτt
αnτ
bτ
t
1−αnτ bτ
t
+1
= (1 − αnτ bτt )2. Solving with respect to bτt and bτ−1t
we obtain the optimal values.
Notice that when densities of both groups are the same, transfers are
equal to zero; that is if sτ−1 = sτ , then bτ−1 = bτ = 0.
Proposition 8 A transfer in the I-th group decreases with an increase in
the amount of resources distorted by government and with an increase in the
density of the other group, whilst it increases with an increase in the density
of his own group.
Proof : Calculating the total differentials, we obtain ∂b
I
t
∂α < 0,
∂bIt
∂sI
> 0,
∂bIt
∂s−I < 0.
Proposition 7 spouses the SMT: the higher the homogeneity among a
group, the higher the power of influence of that group on the Government
and the higher the transfer that the group gets.
Proposition 9 The optimal Lagrange multipliers assume the following val-
ues:
λ∗ =
√
sτ−1sτ (28)
Proof : λ = n
τ−1sτ−1
nτ−1−nτ−1nταbτt =
sτ−1
1−nταbτt =
sτ
1−nτ−1αbτ−1t
Substituting the optimal intergenerational transfers value we obtain:λ∗.
Notice that Proposition 9 respect the Lindbeck and Weibull result, ac-
cording to that the Lagrange multiplier represents the increase in the prob-
ability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional dollar available to
spend on redistribution and must be always greater than zero.
4 An Intuitive Explanation of the decline in the
Labour Unions’ membership
The decline in union membership around the world is a well-documented re-
ality (ILO World Labour Report 1997-1998 [30]) but less known is the fact
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that the decline is due to a rise in the percentage of employees who have
never become members. Analysing the British situation, Bryson and Gomez
[5] discovered that between 1983 and 2001, the percentage of employees who
had never become a member of a labour union had risen by over two-thirds,
from 28 to 48 per cent and that over the same period membership fell by a
third, from 49 to 31 per cent. As a consequence, it seems quite natural to
ask why the young have abandoned the willingness to joint unions. I will use
the basic model I used in Section 2 to provide a possible explanation to the
issue. For doing this I will only make some further necessary assumptions.
Suppose that a third social group (generation) is introduced in the previous
framework, say the teen-agers (T) born at time t. Thus, the space of gener-
ations is now G = {T −2, T −1, T}. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that
the teen-agers are all those who are not still in the labour market. Thus,
the labour union membership is composed by the group of the young plus
the group of the old. At every period of time t, all the teen-agers become
young and enter into the labour market (and join the labour union), all the
young become old and all the old die. Joining the union has now a cost ti
which is different for every individual and it is uniformly distributed among
the two cohorts. A young decides to join the union if his IUF is greater than
the cost he has to bear; that is if
IUF i > ti (29)
At first, let us assume that the numerosity of groups is the same; that is
nτ = nτ−1 = nτ−2. This means the the flow of new labour union members
is constant since the number of each social groups is exactly replaced by the
group of the next generation. Suppose also that the density of the young and
the old is the same and that (31) holds for every i. These assumptions lead
to two conclusions: every worker join the union and numerosity and density
do not determine the optimal wage and hours of groups when the labour
union has to split the optimal amount of hours and wage; thus, the optimal
values are driven exclusively by the preferences of groups which lead to a
desirable solution for both of them. Suppose instead that, at time t due to a
demographic crisis, the numerosity of teen-agers decline over time at a steady
rate equal to d; that is nτt = n
τ−1
t−1 (1−d), nτ+1t+1 = nτt (1−d) = nτt−1(1−d)2, ....
The group of teen-agers is now less numerous of the other two groups. At
time t + 1 the teen-agers become young and the young become old. But
now also nτ−1 < nτ−2 (whilst the density always remain equal across the
cohorts). The power of the old is increased which drive the choice of the
labour unions toward the elder needs. The expected IUF of the young
workers decreases. At this point, suppose that, for some qt+1 young workers,
(31) does not hold anymore, that is IUF i < ti. This time, the young who
have the higher costs to join the union decide not to join. The numerosity
of the young members at time t + 1 will be now equal to ny − qt+1. But
this again reinforce the power of the old who obtain an even more favorable
18
policy. The expected IUF of the young decreases again and this leads a
greater amount of young workers not to join the union at t + 2 and so on
and so forth ad infinitum. Assuming an infinite horizon the conclusion is
that, since qt+1 ≤ qt+2 ≤ ..., the fraction of young members and the total
membership of the labour union will decline and the elder component will
obtain a relative higher IUF. The red area of figure 5 shows the percentage
of young workers which decide not to join the unions due to the high cost
they have to bear to join the union. The result of this process is that fewer
and fewer teen-agers will decide to join the union, the power of the old will
increase and the size of labour unions will become smaller and smaller.
5 Empirical Evidence from the Workplace Em-
ployment Relations Survey 2004
In this section I provide some empirical evidence about the bargaining be-
tween labour unions and firms in the United Kingdom. The source of data
is the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004 (Department
of Trade and Industry, 2005 [13]), which is, to the best of my knowledge the
most comprehensive, existing dataset about industrial relations. A review
of the first findings was released in 2005 [26].
5.1 The Database
The WERS 2004 is a representation of the state of employment relations
and working life inside the British workplaces. Data was collected thanks to
face-to-face interviews with around 3,200 managers and almost 1,000 work-
ers representatives, whilst 20,000 employees answered to a questionnaire.
The scope of the survey covers 700,000 workplaces and 22,5 million employ-
ees which represents the 91 per cent of total employees. The structure of
the survey is made by both a cross-section and a panel component. The for-
mer component collects interviews with the senior manager responsible for
employment relations, whilst the latter was conducted using a random sub-
sample of workplaces that had participated in the 1998 WERS edition and
data was collected via interviews. The WERS 2004 is able to provide use-
ful information about many areas of study: Governance, Partnership, Skills,
Job Satisfaction and Stress, Performance and Technology, Small Workplaces
and Work Representation, Consultation and Communication. I will only
focus on the last issue, as it involves the role of labour unions and the bar-
gaining issues. In this area the WERS 2004 collected data on the union
membership density, the representative voice, the roles and activities of em-
ployee representatives and the role of direct communication. In evaluating
the main findings I will only focus on the representative voice.
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5.2 Main Findings
Among the 36 per cent of workplaces which said to have members of labour
unions, the WERS 2004 gives the possibility to analyse in depth how the
relations between workers and management take place. First of all, as Ta-
ble 1 shows, the attitude of management toward labour unions is most of
the time positive: the 40.62 per cent of the managers said to be in favor
of labour unions, the 47.33 per cent to be neutral and only the 8.96 to be
not in favor. This may already be a significant indicator of the willingness
of the management to negotiate and to assume a collaborative behaviour
toward the labour unions. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the 75.41 per
cent of the labour unions deals with different issues such as the pay or con-
ditions, whilst only the 11.89 per cent only deals with one issue suggesting
the the involvement of labour unions to different issues are one of the most
clear reality; table 3 shows also that the negotiation takes place jointly be-
tween the management and labour unions in the 59.77 per cent of cases.
Tables 4-15 inquire more in details the bargaining process over single issues,
which are: rate of pay, hours of work, holiday entitlements, pension enti-
tlements, recruitment and selections of employees, training of employees,
grievance procedures, disciplinary procedures, staffing plans, equal opportu-
nities, health and safety and performance appraisal. The second column of
each table indicates the number of workplaces, the third the percentage of
workplaces with respect to the number of workplaces which have said to have
at least a labour union, and the fourth the percentage of the workplaces with
respect to the number of total workplaces. As we expected, labour unions
are involved in bargain over the wage, and this happens in the 57.11 per
cent of cases, whilst it is consulted in the 10.33 per cent, only informed in
the 12.51 per cent, and neither informed in the 18.10 per cent. The most
striking result refers to the high percentage of labour unions which bargain
over the hours of work; this happens in the 47.63 per cent of cases which
is almost the same percentage which refers to the rate of pay; furthermore,
over this issue, the 19.11 per cent of the unions are consulted, the 11.34 per
cent informed, and 19.50 per cent non-informed. The same happens for the
negotiation over holiday entitlements (in the 46.39 per cent of cases labour
unions bargain, in the 13.21 per cent are consulted, in the 17.64 informed,
and in the 20.36 non-informed). Once we analyse the results of the other
variables, we may see that the degree of involvement of labour unions into
the bargaining process strongly decreases. For instance, only in one-quarter
of workplaces which have a labour union a bargaining over pension entitle-
ments takes place; this percentage dramatically reduces if we consider the
recruitment and selection of employees (the negotiation take place only in
the 5.98 per cent of cases), the training of employees (6.60 per cent), gre-
viance procedures (28.36 per cent), the disciplinary procedures (28.75 per
cent), the staffing plans (6.68 per cent), the equal opportunities (11.34 per
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cent), the health and safety (12.82 per cent) and the performance appraisal
(10.88 per cent). From the overall analysis of this statistics, we can conclude
that the labour unions are involved in negotiating the pay and the hours of
work, whilst they do not seem to be involved in any issues which refer to
employment, composition of workforce, and other worker benefits, such as
pensions. Thus, the empirical evidence which refers to labour relations in
the U.K. utterly sustain the Pencavel model of efficient bargaining over pay
and hours work, whilst the hypothesis by the other three typical models of
bargaining seem to be rejected, since the Monopoly Union model and the
Right-to-Management model assume that the two parts exclusively bargain
over wage, whilst the Efficient Bargaining model assume that they bargain
over the level of employment and not on the hours of work; instead, we have
seen that the WERS 2004 has shown that this does not happen in reality.
5.3 Pareto Efficiency?
At the time the survey was made, the U.K.’s economy was believed to run
very close to its potential rate of growth, with a very low unemployment
rate around the 5 per cent. After many years where Thatcher’s Government
tried to weaken labour unions, with the victory of Blair’s Labour Party
many reforms were passed in order to improve work relations in U.K.’s
workplaces. The most remarkable example of law passed by the labourist
Government is represented by the Employment Relations Act, passed in
1999 and based on the 1998 Fairness at Work White Paper, whose goal was
to ensure that the UKs system of employment law was based on three main
principles: fairness, flexibility and partnership. The labour unions were
formally recognised, through the statutory recognition, as key partners at
the workplace, working with employers for greater productivity and better
work practices. According to a review conducted by the Department of
Trade and Industry in 2003 which aimed to assess the effects the Act had
brought in U.K. workplaces, “a thousand deals for recognition have been
voluntarily agreed between employers and unions since 1998. Over 700 of
these have been reached since the statutory procedure was introduced. (...)
Where recognition has been awarded (or where it has been voluntarily agreed
without using the statutory procedure), the employers and unions concerned
appear to be moving forward into the bargaining process and establishing
normal working relationships.”My model, the empirical evidence the WERS
2004 has brought, and the Review of the Employment Relations Act together
demonstrate how it is possible to look at an economy where not necessarily
the involvement of workers representatives is seen in a negative way. I
am not only referring to recognized labour unions, since sometimes these
institutions have more aggressive attitudes toward the bargaining issues and
represent the more conflictual reality in industrial relations, but also to less
institutionalized form of workers’ associations. As demonstrated by the
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U.K. experience, a political and legislative environment which encourage
the dialogue between employers and employees and where it is possible to
negotiate over conditions and workers’ needs may increase the flexibility of
the labour market and keep the economy growing at a sound pace.
6 Conclusions
In this model, I applied the SMT to the labour market, where wages are
endogenously determined according to an Efficient Bargaining model over
wage and hours of work. I analysed a society composed by two groups
of workers (the old and the young) which belong to a labour union and a
firm. I assumed also that the preferences of the old for leisure differ from
the preferences of the young. Under these conditions, I demonstrated that
in a PVM where social groups have to split the amount of hours worked,
the optimal quota of resources that any social group obtains is represented
by a weighted average which is a function of the Numerosity, Density and
Preferences of the group, which I called NDP −WAH . Since the single-
mindedness of a group, which represents a proxy for the political power of
that group, is captured by the density function which is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to leisure, I conclude that the group with
higher preferences for leisure (presumably the old) has a great power of
influence onto politicians. This power enables them to get positive benefits in
equilibrium, whose burden is entirely carried by the other group (presumably
the young). Thus, with respect to the previous work, this study consider
the mechanisms of labour unions, seen as an institution representing the
interests of different social groups. Again, according to the SMT, the greater
the ability of a single group to be oriented toward the minimum number of
issues, the higher the probability that this group achieves its goals.
The empirical evidence provided by the WERS 2004 should definely
bring new support to models which too often were not sufficiently considered
in the literature as they would deserve, such as Pencavel’s, and discourage
the use of these models which only consider the bargaining over wage which
seem to at odds with what happens in the real world.
Nevertheless, this work does not consider some aspects which would
deserve to be analysed. First of all, it would be interesting to consider more
in details, the mechanisms which are undertaken by unions to take their
decisions (i.e. voting process, elections and so forth). Furthermore, since an
imperfect labour market entails unemployment in equilibrium, it would be
interesting to add some new social groups (i.e. the unemployed) to analyse
the impact of labour unions on excluded workers. Finally, strange enough,
the relation between hours of work and employment has not been studied
in a systematic way.
I hope this suggestions will find a place in future researches.
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7 Appendix
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidates’ problem. The two
candidates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes
or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but
it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
subject to:
T τ−1t = n
τ−1ττ−1Lt w
τ−1(H − hτ−1lt ) (30)
T τt = n
τττLtw
τ (H − hτlt) (31)
nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0 (32)
where: sI = sI(l(τLt, wt))
Substituting wI∗t and h
I∗
lt into equation (30), (31) and (32) I obtain:
T τ−1t = n
τ−1ττ−1Lt w
τ−1∗(H − hτ−1∗lt ) (33)
T τt = n
τττLtw
τ∗(H − hτ∗lt ) (34)
nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0 (35)
and finally I may write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)−V i(~qB)] +λ
(
nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt |)
I write the First Order Conditions which can be seen as a modified version of the
Lindbeck and Weibull First Order Conditions in a PVM modified for the exogenous den-
sity:
(1) ∂L
∂ττ−1
Lt
= nτ−1
(
∂sτ−1
∂hτ−1∗
lt
∂hτ−1∗
lt
∂ττ−1
Lt
(V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)) + sτ−1( ∂V i(~qA)
∂ττ−1
Lt
)
)
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂ττ
Lt
= nτ
(
∂sτ
∂hτ∗
lt
∂hτ∗
lt
∂ττ
Lt
(V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)) + sτ ( ∂V i(~qA)
∂ττ
Lt
)
)
= 0
(3) ∂L
∂bτ−1
t
= nτ−1sτ−1 = µ(nτ−1 − nτ−1nταbτ−1)
(4) ∂L
∂bτ
t
= nτsτ = µ(nτ − nτnτ−1αbτ−1)
(5)nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0
By Corollary 4 we know that in equilibrium V i(~qA) = V i(~qB) such that we obtain:
(1) ∂L
∂ττ−1
Lt
= nτ−1
(
sτ−1( ∂V
I (~qA)
∂ττ−1
Lt
)
)
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂ττ
Lt
= nτ
(
sτ ( ∂V
I (~qA)
∂τ
y
Lt
)
)
= 0
(3) ∂L
∂bτ−1
t
= nτ−1sτ−1 = µ(nτ−1 − nτ−1nταbτ−1)
(4) ∂L
∂bτ
t
= nτsτ = µ(nτ − nτnτ−1αbτ−1)
(5)nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0
and
(1) ∂L
∂ττ−1
Lt
= ∂V
I (~qA)
∂ττ−1
Lt
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂ττ
Lt
= ∂V
I (~qA)
∂ττ
Lt
= 0
(3) ∂L
∂bτ−1
t
= sτ−1 = µ(1− nταlbτ−1)
(4) ∂L
∂bτ
t
= sτ = µ(1− nτ−1αbτ−1)
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(5)nτ−1bτ−1t + n
τ bτt + α
∣∣nτ−1bτ−1t ∣∣ |nτ bτt | = 0
Solving the equation we obtain the optimal tax rates: ττ−1∗Lt = τ
τ−1
Lt (n
τ−1, nτ , χτ−1, χτ , ψτ−1, sτ−1,u, sτ,u, H, x, λ)
and ττ∗Lt = τ
τ
Lt(n
τ−1, nτ , χτ−1, χτ , ψτ−1, sτ−1,u, sτ,u, H, x, λ).
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Table 1: How would you describe management's general attitude towards trade union membership among 
employees at this establishment. Is management ... 
 
 Frequency Percentage  
In favour 381 40.62 
Not in favour   84 8.96 
Neutral 444 47.33 
Other answer 29 3.09 
Total  938 100 
 
 
Table2: Does the committee deal with a range of issues, or with a single topic such as health and safety? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 9  1.84 0.96 
Range of issues 368 75.41 39.23 
Single topic(s) 58 11.89 6.18 
Both 53 10.86 5.65 
Total  488 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
 
Table3: Does management negotiate jointly with the recognised unions, or are there separate negotiations?  
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 1 0.28 0.11 
Don't know 16 4.53 1.71 
Jointly (3) 211 59.77 22.49 
Separatly (4) 82 23.23 8.74 
At least two (5) 43 12.18 4.58 
Total  353 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
(3) all recognised unions negotiate over pay as one unit,  
(4) each recognised union negotiates independently over pay 
(5) At least two recognised unions jointly negotiate over  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about the rate of pay? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer  3        0.23  0.13 
Don't know 22 1.71 0.96 
Negotiates 735 57.11 32.03 
Consults 133 10.33 5.80 
Informs 161 12.51 7.02 
Not inform 233 18.10 10.15 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table5: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about hours of work? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 24 1.86 1.05 
Negotiates 613 47.63 26.71 
Consults 246 19.11 10.72 
Informs 146 11.34 6.36 
Not inform 251 19.50 10.94 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 6: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about holiday 
entitlementes? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 24 1.86   1.05 
Negotiates 597 46.39 26.01 
Consults 170 13.21 7.41 
Informs 227 17.64 9.89 
Not inform 262 20.36 11.42 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about pension 
entitlementes? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 49 3.81 2.14 
Negotiates 328 25.49 14.29 
Consults 220 17.09 9.59 
Informs 397 30.85 17.30 
Not inform 286 22.22 12.46 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 8: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about recruitment or 
selection of employees? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 21 1.63 0.92 
Negotiates 77   5.98 3.36 
Consults 302 23.47 13.16 
Informs 360 27.97 15.69 
Not inform 520 40.40 22.66 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 9: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about training of 
employees? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 18 1.40 0.78 
Negotiates 85 6.60 3.70 
Consults 394 30.61 17.17 
Informs 359 27.89 15.64 
Not inform 424 32.94 18.47 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about grievance 
procedures?  
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 6 0.47 0.26 
Don't know 20 1.55 0.87   
Negotiates 365 28.36 15.90 
Consults 499 38.77 21.74 
Informs 188 14.61 8.19 
Not inform 209 16.24 9.11 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 11: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about disciplinary 
procedures?  
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 6 0.47 0.26 
Don't know 22 1.71   0.96 
Negotiates 370 28.75 16.12 
Consults 490 38.07 21.35 
Informs 195 15.15 8.50 
Not inform 204 15.85 8.89 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 12: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about staffing plans?  
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 27 2.10 1.18 
Negotiates 86 6.68 3.75 
Consults 466 36.21   20.31 
Informs 347 26.96 15.12 
Not inform 354 27.51 15.42 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about equal 
opportunities?  
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 27 2.10 1.18 
Negotiates 146 11.34 6.36 
Consults 561 43.59 24.44 
Informs 270 20.98   11.76 
Not inform 276 21.45 12.03 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 14: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about health and 
safety? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 22 1.71 0.96 
Negotiates 165 12.82 7.19 
Consults 679 52.76 29.59   
Informs 200 15.54 8.71 
Not inform 214 16.63 9.32 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
 
Table 15: Does management normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions about performance 
appraisal? 
 
 Frequency Percentage (1) Percentage (2) 
Refuse to answer 7 0.54 0.31 
Don't know 30 2.33 1.31 
Negotiates 140 10.88   6.10 
Consults 458 35.59 19.96 
Informs 256 19.89 11.15 
Not inform 396 30.77 17.25 
Total  1,287 100 100 
(1) of the applicable cases 
(2) of both the applicable and non-applicable cases 
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FIGURE 3 – The optimal policy vector in the 
labour union PVM 
FIGURE 4 – Effects on welfare 
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FIGURE 5 – The uniform distribution of the cost to 
join the labour union at time t+1 a) and t+2 b) 
